The article and photo contained here are in the public domain due to the age of publication. I have done nothing to the work other than to fix a few spelling errors.
RETREAT OF GENERAL ROBERT S. GARNETT.
By Hu Maxwell.
The TransAllegheny Historical Magazine: Volume 1 Issue 3
Published October 1901
The most important military movement west of the Alleghenies in West Virginia during the Civil War was the effort made by the Confederate Government in 1861 to hold the northwestern part of the State, and the counter movement by the Federal forces to prevent it. The commanding general of the Confederates was Robert S. Garnett, and the Union army opposing was led by General George B. McClellan. In this article it is not the purpose to enter into details of the movements of the armies prior to July 12, the date on which the Confederates retreated from Laurel Hill. But fuller mention will be given to the incidents of the retreat, and in doing this the chief reliance for data is not upon the official records, but upon the personal experiences and observations of those who took part in or witnessed the retreat. That is, I have endeavored to collect facts and incidents that are not found in the records. Many of these are trivial, but they concern an important event in the history of the State and are worth preserving. They show how the citizens who had never before seen war, acted when they suddenly found themselves in the midst of its realities. The principal conclusion is that alarm and consternation quickly gave way to the impulse to turn the misfortunes of the defeated army into profit for themselves.
It is proper, however, to allude briefly to the events preceding July 12, which explain why the Confederates found it necessary to leave northwestern Virginia by mountain paths and narrow roads. When the war began the authorities at Richmond saw the need of defending the northwestern part of the State from invasion which was expected from Ohio and Pennsylvania. It was hoped, perhaps believed, that the inhabitants of the Northwest would organize and repel the invasion; but they did not do so. They could not have done so, had they tried, and they did not try. The majority of them had no sympathy with the secession movement of the East and South. A Confederate officer, a veteran of the Mexican War, Colonel George A. Porterfield, was sent to Grafton in May to collect and organize forces and take charge of the defense of that part of the State. He was ordered to advance to Wheeling, but he proceeded no farther than Grafton. He was not furnished with guns, ammunition, provisions or men. His whole force, mostly collected in the counties west of the Alleghenies, did not exceed one thousand men, and these were almost without arms. A successful defense was impossible, and he fell back to Philippi when General McClellan crossed the Ohio. On June 3 he was attacked at Philippi, and fell back to Huttonsville, forty miles farther south. There he was superseded by General Garnett, who early in July had accumulated ample stores and had six thousand soldiers.
The Union forces had been slow to follow their success, and had not advanced far south from Philippi. General Garnett fortified a camp on Laurel Hill, between Beverly and Philippi, and another camp on Rich Mountain, between Beverly and Buckhannon. If the Federals should advance south they would be stopped by these defenses; for the only two practicable roads were thus closed. General Garnett's first thought was to check any further movement south by the Federals. But he hoped to do more than that. He had designs on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and formed his plans for its capture and defense. He spoke of moving north to Evansville in Preston County, there forming a camp and base of supplies within five miles of the railroad at Independence. From there he could strike both east and west. He thought of building a military road up Cheat River from Rowlesburg to St. George to facilitate his movements, particularly to provide a line of retreat in case he should be defeated and find the communication cut off with Beverly and the south, through Barbour County. These were plans which he never had an opportunity to execute. General McClellan was already moving against his camps on Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain.
Colonel John Pegram commanded the thirteen hundred Confederates at Rich Mountain; General Garnett had personal command of 4,585 at Laurel Hill, twelve miles distant. Against Rich Mountain, General McClellan led, or had in reserve, sixteen thousand men; General Morris led three thousand against Laurel Hill. This latter movement was only a feint. No general attack was to be made on Laurel Hill, but the position was to be threatened for the purpose of holding General Garnett there, while McClellan attacked Rich Mountain. That plan was successfully carried out.
Military critics have found fault with McClellan's tactics. It was currently reported and generally believed in his camp that General Garnett had ten thousand men at Laurel Hill, yet McClellan sent three thousand against him, while himself marched by way of Buckhannon to attack Rich Mountain. Had Garnett been as strong as reported, he could have overpowered the forces sent against Laurel Hill and could then have marched toward Clarksburg, fallen in the rear of McClellan's force, and the chance for the Union army's escape would have been poor. But Garnett had four thousand instead of ten thousand, and could not take advantage of his adversary's blunder—which, in fact, he never discovered.
While General Morris held the attention of the Confederates at Laurel Hill by throwing an occasional shell, McClellan approached the other camp at Rich Mountain, and sent General Rosecrans with about two thousand men to make an attack on the flank and rear. The Confederates were defeated, and fled with the loss of all their supplies. Their forces were scattered over the mountains, and more than half were captured within the next day or two. About forty made their escape into Pendleton County over what is known as the Seneca trail, an old path made by the Indians, and used many years afterwards by white people. Others made their way to Huttonsville, where they reached the pike leading to Staunton. Colonel Scott with about six hundred men was near Beverly when the battle occurred. He retreated toward Staunton. This left the road open for McClellan's troops to enter Beverly, and thus fall in the rear of Garnett at Laurel Hill. But McClellan was very slow to take that advantage. He waited until there was ample time for Garnett to pass through Beverly and escape—of course his delay was not for the purpose of permitting the Confederates to escape, but they could have done it. Why they did not will presently be seen.
When General Garnett learned that the position at Rich Mountain had been lost, he sent a message to Colonel Scott to hold the Federals in check a few hours, if possible, on the road between Rich Mountain and Beverly. This would give him time to pass Beverly on his retreat toward Staunton. The messenger overtook Colonel Scott seven miles south of Beverly. He was already retreating, and could not and did not attempt to hold the Federals in check. Meantime General Garnett was retreating, and was trying to reach Beverly and pass that point before the arrival of the victorious troops of the enemy, coming in from Rich Mountain. He could have done so, had he not been deceived by his own scouts, who approached within a mile of Beverly, and seeing soldiers in the town, galloped beck and reported that the Union army had already arrived at the designated point. The men they saw, however, were only Confederate stragglers who had not yet left Beverly.
General Garnett supposed, upon that erroneous information, that his retreat by way of the Staunton pike was cut off, and he turned back, and endeavored to escape by following county roads through Tucker and Preston counties, into Hardy County (now Grant). In the meantime McClellan's forces followed the retreating Confederates who had gone south from Beverly, but did not overtake them. Their only success was the capture of Colonel Melvin Currence, who had collected militia about Huttonsville, under order from General Garnett, and was engaged in guarding obscure roads crossing Rich Mountain south of the battlefield. Learning that the Confederate army had been defeated, Colonel Currence retired to the valley near Huttonsville with his militia where he took a stand. As the Union forces began to draw near, his men took to their heels, and in a short time the Colonel was absolutely alone. He stood his ground and the Federals took him prisoner.
In the meantime General Garnett, with 4,585 men, was trying to make his escape through Tucker county, hard pressed by General Morris who followed him from Laurel Hill with three thousand men. On the night of July 12 the Confederates camped on Pheasant Run, a branch of Cheat River, just in the edge of Randolph County. It was a rainy night. They had blockaded the road behind them by felling trees across it. At S o'clock on the morning of July 13 the army under General Morris passed the site of the present city of Elkins. It was all forest and farmland then. The Federals had followed in such haste from their camp at Belington, Barbour County, when they discovered that the Confederates were retreating, that they carried with them very little rations. The soldiers were soon very hungry; and, as the retreating Confederates swept the country clear of provisions along the line of march, there was little left on which the pursuing Union troops could subsist. They were soon so nearly famished that they killed cattle and ate the unsalted and uncooked meat. The pursuit was vigorous. The blockades were cut out of the road, and at eight o'clock on the morning of July 13 the advance guard overtook and fired upon the rear of the Confederates as they were leaving their camp on Pheasant Run. The fire was returned, but General Garnett made no stand at that place. At the Kalor ford, on Shaver's Fork of Cheat River, some of the Confederate wagons were stalled. While trying to extricate them, the Federals again came up and opened fire. It became a running fight for the next four miles. The Confederates set ambuscades and held the pursuers in check, at different points, thus giving the wagons and baggage time to get ahead. About two hundred Georgia troops who had been placed in concealment behind a fence for the purpose of firing upon the pursuers when they came up, failed, for some reason, to fire, and permitted the Federal army to pass. The Confederates in ambuscade were thus cut off from the main army; but their presence was not discovered by the Union troops, else they would have been captured. They fled into the woods, where they soon encountered a citizen (James Parsons) who volunteered to pilot them across the Alleghenies to Pendleton County. The distance was about forty miles, an untrodden wilderness, much of it of tangled laurel and pine forest. They traveled by compass, and ultimately reached the Confederate lines in Highland County, Virginia. They nearly died of hunger. Twenty years afterwards the writer of this was able to trace their line of retreat through the wilderness on the tributaries of Otter Fork of Cheat River, by the birch trees from which the bark had been peeled for food by the soldiers. It may be remarked that one of the men who made this difficult retreat had been shot entirely through the head with a musket ball. The bullet had missed the brain, passing back of the face. He was alive and able to travel when they reached Pendleton County. I do not know what became of him.
After the skirmish at Kalor's Ford, the Confederates moved on three miles to another ford where they made a stand. Here occurred the battle of Corrick's Ford, about two o'clock. It was only a brisk skirmish, not more than twenty being killed, all but two of them being Confederates. When the fight began, the citizens fled to the woods. Some of them saw the whole affair from a neighboring hill. They reported that the Confederate fire swept the Union troops down by hundreds, and that they saw them fall. You can hear this report even to this day in that neighborhood, and it is believed. Those who reported it were honest, but were mistaken. It was an excusable mistake, however, easily explained. When the Federal officer discovered the batteries in front of him about to fire, he ordered, "Flat to the ground." His men obeyed, and the discharge went over them. This was what the citizens saw.
The battle of Corrick's Ford was not fought at Corrick's Ford, but at a ford half a mile above. General Garnett was killed at Corrick's Ford, on the ground now occupied by the pulp mill, in the town of Parsons. After his army had retreated, he remained with the rear. At Corrick's Ford he ordered about a dozen sharpshooters to post themselves behind a pile of driftwood to check the pursuers. As he sat on his horse directing them where to go, he was shot from the other side of he river. His body was sent to Rowlesburg in care of Whitelaw Reid, who was then a newspaper correspondent with the Federal army. From Rowlesburg the corpse was sent to Grafton and thence by express to Richmond. The Federals made no pursuit beyond Corrick's Ford, except that the cavalry followed some fifteen miles to pick up plunder and prisoners. Two miles below Corrick's Ford the Confederates made another stand in expectation of attack. This was at Job's Ford. There was no pursuit, and they moved on. The condition of the soldiers had become deplorable. They had plenty of rations, but no time to cook anything. . The incessant rains had made the road next to impassable. They had no ambulances. The wounded and sick rode in the wagons, or were left behind. A young boy, with a foot shot off, rode on a cannon. The sick and exhausted fell by the wayside. That, however, is a common feature of all retreats. When the army reached Horseshoe Run, a false report came that the pursuers were only two miles back. There was a halt for battle at Low Gap, which commanded the road for two miles. While preparing to make a stand there, report of a more serious nature was brought by Ezekiel Harper, a citizen who had been doing some volunteer scouting up the Horseshoe Run road. He said that the Federals were concentrating at the Red House, eighteen miles east, at the intersection of the Horseshoe Run road and the Northwestern Pike. This would cut off the retreat of the Confederates, if true. It was partly true, as was subsequently learned. The Federals were there, but not in sufficient strength to stop the retreat. The report caused no small consternation among the Confederates. Instead of making a stand at Low Gap, the artillery and cavalry were sent to the front. In passing the infantry and wagons, the cavalry left the road and crossed fields. The deep path made by horses on that occasion remained visible on the sodded ground for more than twenty-five years. Panic seized the army. Wagons were unloaded, supplies were thrown away, and the retreat became a route. Had the pursuit been vigorous few could have escaped. But the^ pursuers were in little less sorry plight than the pursued.
Darkness set in before the head of Horseshoe Run was reached. The cavalry picked up a citizen (Samuel Porter) who declared that there was only one possible way of escape, and he knew that way. The Federals, he said, were at the Red House. But he knew a path across the Alleghenies to Stony River, and would guide them. His offer was accepted and the cavalry left the road to follow a mountain path. (Perhaps all the cavalry did not leave the road). They had not gone far when they were accosted by a mountaineer who took them for Union troops and volunteered information that he could collect one hundred men and ''bushwhack rebels to beat the nation.'' His chagrin could not be concealed when they informed him that he was in the hands of the rebels and might consider himself a prisoner. The cavalry emerged from the wilderness and reached the Northwestern Pike near Mount Storm, July 14.
The main army continued its retreat and at four o'clock on the morning of July 14 reached the Red House. The Federal picket, which had been stationed there, retreated at the approach of the army. It may be stated that during all that night and the afternoon of the day before, the Federals had been hurrying troops to the Red House to intercept the retreating Confederates. The railroad had been unloading them at Oakland and elsewhere, and they were marching across the country to that point, but they came too late. The Confederates were not again molested. They retreated through Hardy (now Grant) and Pendleton counties, and thus made their escape. Some of them marched from Pheasant Run to Petersburg in Grant County, with nothing to eat.
The sudden appearance of an army in the sequestered nooks of West Virginia created much excitement at first among the people, who never had seen war in any form. The news that the army was throwing away its store of clothing, food and military supplies spread rapidly, and the citizens came nocking from all sides to share in the spoils. The army's supply of blankets seems to have been nearly all homemade, furnished perhaps, by private families in the South who contributed of their means to equip the troops sent to the field. The blankets were woolen, white and of a superior quality. They were thrown away by hundreds, and the people gathered them eagerly. The larger portion of them were taken by the pursuing Federals, yet enough remained, which had been successfully concealed, to provide warm beds in many a mountain household for years to come. As might be expected, some diseases prevalent in that army (and nearly all armies) were communicated by the blankets, and other clothing, especially the malady known in the doctors' books as Sarcoptes Scabiei but the average native did not think it a bad bargain to scratch seven years for the sake of getting a supply of blankets that would last the remainder of his natural life. It is probable that some of those blankets are still in use in Tucker County.
When the Federal cavalry came up, everything that had belonged to the Confederates, that could be found and identified, was taken. They swept the country, not only along the main roads, but they followed paths, and traversed the forests and fields, searching in every nook and corner for hidden articles. It is surprising that anything escaped. Yet, in one instance, a wagon that had been hidden was not found. The people had not anticipated a search so thorough. They supposed that things hidden in the woods would not be found. A fine violin was picked up by a young lady. She wrapped it carefully in a shawl, took it to the woods back of the house, and laid it in the forks of a bush. The first Yankee who came found it and she saw him pass the house with it, shawl and all. The young lady's brother appropriated a valuable trunk, filled with fine clothing He carried all into the house, hoping to hide them. He was thoughtful enough to deposit in his pocket forty dollars in gold which he found in the trunk. He saved that, but the mud on the trunk betrayed it, and it went. A mountaineer (Stephen Lipscomb) carried a barrel of flour on his shoulder three miles, and succeeded in keeping it. One would conclude that he earned it, as it weighed two hundred pounds. Two other men dragged a five hundred pound box of guns half a mile through the woods. They had just reached a deep pool of water in which they intended to sink it when the Federals overtook them and relieved them of their burden. Enough shoes to supply a considerable part of a regiment were picked up by a citizen (Andrew B. Parsons) and were concealed under the floor of his house. The keen eyed soldiers soon found them. Another citizen (William Losh) who considered his opportunities and did not want anybody to be amazed at his moderation, hitched up his cart to haul loot home by cartloads. Unfortunately, while making his way home with the first load, pursuers came upon the scene. He tried to get away, but a wheel came off, and he abandoned the cart and its contents, and he never saw them again.
While Mr. Losh was looking after things of practical use, his two sons were engaged in the philanthropic work of picking up sick and disabled Confederates who had fallen by the wayside. Such of these as could not walk they carried on their backs to a vacant cabin half mile from the road, in a deep ravine. They filled the cabin with unfortunates of all kinds.'sick, wounded and starving. By some freak or chance, beyond explanation the Union soldiers failed to discover what was in the cabin. They found everything else in the vicinity, even down to a knife buried in the ground. Some of the people in the neighborhood attributed the escape to a special interposition of Providence in favor of the poor rebels. Be that as it may, the old cabin was converted into a hospital on a small scale, and its wants were supplied by the Losh boys to the best of their ability. In course of time they piloted their convalescents through the woods, across the Alleghenies, and saw them safe within the Confederate lines. The character of the articles thrown away by Garnett's army showed that many of the soldiers came from wealthy families. The clothing in many of the trunks was of the best. In addition to that, there was much brica-a-brac which a soldier in active duty has no use for. These things had been brought from home (some of the soldiers so explained) under the belief that the campaign would be only a summer outing and that there would be no real war. The week from July 11 to 18, 1861, dispelled that delusion.
* Those who may wish to consult the official records and document of the retreat, and of the events leading to it, will find the subject fully covered in Vol. II, Series 1, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, as published by the U. S. War Department, pages 193 to 292. The best accounts of the retreat, from the Federal side, are the reports of General Morris to McClellan, July 14, including Captain H. W. Benham's report of July 13. On the Confederate side the best report is that of Colonel W. B. Taliaferro, dated Monterey August 10, and addressed to General H. R. Jackson.
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